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ISSUE THREE 
Did the District Court err in concluding that the default judgment against Defendants was 
appropriate where Plaintiffs original complaint failed to allege facts that meet the legal 
requirements for adverse possession as against a cotenant? 
Standard of Review 
This issue presents a question of law. An appellate court reviews the trial court's 
application of law de novo. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
U.S. Const, amend. V provides as follows: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval 
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation. 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1 provides as follows: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor den> any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7 provides as follows: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 4 (d)(4)(a) (2002) provides as follows: 
Where the identity or whereabouts of the person to be served are unknown and cannot be 
ascertained through reasonable diligence, where service upon all of the individual parties 
is impracticable under the circumstances, or where there exists good cause to believe that 
the person to be served is avoiding service of process, the party seeking service of 
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process may file a motion supported by affidavit requesting an order allowing service by 
publication or by some other means. The supporting affidavit shall set forth the efforts 
made to identify, locate or serve the party to be served, or the circumstances which make 
it impracticable to serve all if the individual parties. (The relevant language is the same as 
in the former Rule 4(g).) 
Utah R. Civ. P. 55 (a)(1) provides as follows: 
When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead 
or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk 
shall enter his default. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
On May 9, 2002, Defendants, pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, filed a Motion to Quash Service and Set Aside the Default Judgment entered against 
them on January 20, 1999 in the Fifth Judicial District Court in Washington County, Utah. The 
default judgment declared that Plaintiff had acquired fee simple ownership of Defendants' 
interest in the property in question by adverse possession and declared any interests claimed by 
Defendants to be null and void. Defendants' Motion was brought on the ground that the 1999 
judgment was void because (1) Plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to 
locate and notify Defendants of the action prior to attempting service by publication, and (2) 
Plaintiffs original complaint failed to state a cause of action for adverse possession against a 
cotenant. 
The court reserved decision on the motion until the conclusion of briefing and oral 
argument. Following briefing and oral argument, the court issued its August 12, 2002 order 
denying Defendants' Motion, finding that Plaintiffs efforts to locate and notify Defendants were 
reasonable and that the 1999 default judgment was appropriate. The trial court also certified its 
order as final and appealable. From the trial court's August 12, 2002 order denying their Motion 
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to Quash Service and Set Aside Default Judgment, Defendants appeal, asserting (1) that the trial 
court improperly sustained service by publication where Plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient 
to satisfy reasonable diligence in attempting to locate and notify Defendants, (2) that the trial 
court inappropriately applied a "totality of the circumstances" standard to the determination of 
whether Plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence, and (3) that the trial court improperly sustained 
default judgment where Plaintiffs original complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to establish 
adverse possession as against a cotenant. 
Disposition at Trial Court 
Relying solely on Plaintiffs efforts to save the property in question from two tax sales 
and on a telephone call between Douglas Marrs and Plaintiff in 1986, the trial court concluded 
that based on the totality of the circumstances, Plaintiff had exercised reasonable diligence in 
attempting to locate and notify Defendants and denied Defendants' Motion to Quash Service and 
Set Aside the Default Judgment. The trial court certified its order as a final and appealable. 
Statement of Facts 
1. On or about August 12, 1968, Bob Marrs, Mac Reber and lone H. Reber, purchased the 
following property (hereafter the "Property") in Washington County, Utah: 
E Vi SE VA Section Lot 10 5 acres "All mineral rights" 
NW VA Section Lot 11 10 acres "Proper Access to ALC" 
SW VA Section Lot 11 10 acres "Properties here listed" 
SE VA Section Lot 6 
Bob Marrs acquired an. undivided lA interest in the Property and Mac and lone H. Reber also 
acquired an undivided lA interest in the Property. (Record hereinafter "R." at 45) 
2. On or about March 24, 1981, Robert C. Marrs as Personal Representative of the Estate 
of Bob Marrs, deeded an undivided VA interest to Robert C. Marrs and an undivided VA interest to 
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Douglas R. Marrs of the following real property (hereafter the "Property, same as above) in 
Washington County, Utah: 
The East one-half of the Southeast Quarter of Lot 10, and the Northwest Quarter 
Sectional Lot 11; the Southwest Quarter of Sectional Lot 11; and the Southwest 
Quarter of Sectional Lot 6; all located in Section 19, Township 39 South, Range 
10 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. Together with access across existing roads 
and all appurtenances. 
(R. at 45-46) 
3. Plaintiff acquired Mac. Reber's undivided lA interest in the Property by public auction 
on or about September 12, 1985, for $7,500 credited from a prior judgment lien attached to the 
Property. (R. at 87-88) 
4. In January of 1986, soon after Plaintiff acquired its interest in the Property, one of the 
Defendants, Douglas Marrs, contacted Plaintiff to discuss the Property and exchange work phone 
numbers. (R. at 49). 
5. On or about September 2, 1998, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for quiet title with the Fifth 
Judicial District Court in Washington County, Utah, in which it claimed to have adversely 
possessed the Defendants' interest in the Property. (R. at 2-7). 
6. In support of its cause of action to quiet title and for adverse possession, Plaintiff 
alleged the following: 
a. Plaintiff invested substantial time and money in improving the Property. 
b. Plaintiff improved the roads appurtenant to the Property and fenced the 
perimeter of the property. 
c. Defendants did not visit the Property or attempt to possess or improve the 
Property for some seventeen years prior to the filing of the Complaint. 
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d. Plaintiff paid the full amount of property taxes for the Property during the 
seventeen years following acquisition of its interest in the Property. 
e. Defendants did not pay taxes on the Property during that period of time. 
f. Plaintiff redeemed the Property on more than one occasion from tax sales, and 
paid the full delinquencies, interest, penalties and costs to Washington County on each 
occasion. 
g. Plaintiff maintained insurance on the Property. 
h. Plaintiff possessed and occupied the Property in excess of seven years 
adversely to Defendants. 
i. Plaintiff improved the land, its roads and access thereto, protected the Property 
by such enclosures, if any, and to the extent necessary, used the land for: fuel, fencing 
timber, husbandry, or for pasturage, and for the ordinary usages for which the Property 
could be utilized, and invested labor and money in constructing and/or improving roads, 
access, dams, canals, embankments, aqueducts or otherwise for the purpose of irrigating 
or controlling water. 
j . Plaintiff occupied and claimed the land for at least seven years continuously and 
exclusively, and that Plaintiff was the only party to pay taxes on the Property for the 
previous seven years. 
(R. at 3-6) 
7. At the time the Complaint was filed, both Defendants and Plaintiff owned an 
undivided one-half interest as tenants in common in the Property and each was aware of the other 
party's interest in the Property. (R. at 2-3, 46, 49) 
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8. Simultaneous to filing its Complaint, Plaintiff filed an Ex Parte Motion for Notice by 
Publication (hereafter "Ex Parte Motion") and Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Service by 
Publication (hereafter "Affidavit of Counsel"). (R. at 9-12; 15-17) 
9. In the Affidavit of Counsel, counsel for Plaintiff alleged the following regarding 
efforts made to locate and notify Defendants: 
That the last reported address for defendants Robert C. Marrs and Douglas R. 
Marrs, obtained from documents filed with the Washington County recorder, is 
not viable, and that I am unable to determine the location or address of any of the 
named defendants and therefore believe that the only effective means of 
communicating service upon the defendants is by publication in a newspaper of 
record in and for Washington County, State of Utah, or in the alternative, in a 
paper of general circulation in the Santa Clara County, State of California area. 
(R. at 16) 
10. In the Ex Parte Motion, Plaintiff stated that the addresses and locations of both 
Defendants were unknown and that personal service would have been ineffective. (R. at 9-10) 
11. Plaintiff also admitted in its Ex Parte Motion that the only effort it made to notify 
Defendants was to send a certified letter to an old address of one of the Defendants, Douglas 
Marrs. (R. at 9-10) 
12. After the letter was returned as undeliverable, Plaintiff made no additional efforts to 
locate either Defendant. (R. at 9-10) 
13. On or about September 11, 1998, the Fifth Judicial District Court ordered alternative 
service by publication. (R. at 18-19) 
14. In compliance with the District Court's order for service by publication, Plaintiff 
published a Notice of Termination of Property Interests through Quiet Title and Adverse 
Possession in the Daily Spectrum, a newspaper primarily circulated in Washington County, on 
the 5th, 12th, 19th and 26th of November 1998. (R. at 30-31) 
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15. Because Defendants failed to appear at the scheduled hearing, on or about January 
20, 1999, the District Court granted Plaintiff a Default Judgment which declared Plaintiff to be 
the sole owner and fee simple titleholder of the Property and which declared that any interests 
claimed by Defendants were null and void. (R. at 30-31) 
16. Over the course of approximately 13 years previous to the filing of its Complaint, 
during which time Defendants and Plaintiff concurrently owned the Property, Plaintiff does not 
claim to have made any attempts to locate or contact either Defendant. 
17. Defendant, Douglas Marrs, has been employed with the same company, Coast 
Provision Company, in the same city, Santa Fe Springs, California, since 1979. The address and 
phone number of the company has been listed in the local phone book since 1979. (R. at 50) 
18. Defendant, Douglas Marrs, has resided in the region of San Pedro, California since 
1979 and has resided at his current address in San Pedro since 1991. His correct addresses have 
been listed in the San Pedro phone book since 1979. (R. at 50) 
19. Plaintiff was acquainted with Mac Reber, a former cotenant of the Property and 
resident of Washington County, whose interest in the Property Plaintiff acquired in 1985. Mr. 
Reber, as a former tenant in common with Defendants, was well acquainted with Robert and 
Douglas Marrs and had in his possession at all relevant times the contact information for both 
Defendants. (R. at 46, 78) 
20. On or about December 1, 2001, Defendant, Robert Marrs, contacted Russell Shirts of 
the Washington County Recorder's Office, to inquire as to the status of the Property. Two days 
later, Defendants received their first notice of Plaintiffs Complaint and subsequent Default 
Judgment against their interests in the Property. (R. at 47) 
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21. Upon verifying the accuracy of this information, Defendants retained counsel who 
subsequently filed the subject Motion to Quash Service and Set Aside Default Judgment on May 
9, 2002. (R. at 32-33) 
22. On August 1, 2002, a hearing was held on the Motion to Quash Service and Set 
Aside Default Judgment. (R. at 105) 
23. On August 12, 2002, Judge James L. Shumate issued an Order whereby he denied 
Defendants' Motion to Quash Service and Set Aside Default Judgment. (R. at 92-94) 
24. In denying Defendant's motion, Judge Shumate stated: 
In looking at the totality of the circumstances, facts before me are that this 
property had gone delinquent twice, would have gone to tax sale had it not been 
for plaintiffs action... Mr. Rex Jackson has no information on (the 1986 phone 
conversation between Jackson and Douglas Marrs).. .he still just doesn't have a 
recollection (of that conversation).. .That's part of the totality. Looking at that 
totality, under these circumstances, I do find that the diligence exercised by the 
plaintiff was reasonable... Making this decision, I could truly be wrong. 
(R. at 120-21) 
25. On September 6, 2002, Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal with the Fifth Judicial 
District Court for Washington County, Utah. (R. at 95-96) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Due process requires that before a party may be permitted to use substitute service of 
process, the party must first demonstrate that it exercised due diligence in attempting to locate 
and notify interested parties of action pending against them. Plaintiffs affidavit failed to state 
facts sufficient to show conformity with the due diligence requirements of Rule 4(d)(4)(A) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in attempting to locate the whereabouts of Defendants. Therefore, 
the district court erred in allowing Plaintiff to serve Defendants by publication. The district court 
also erred by dismissing Defendant's Motion to Quash Service and Set Aside Default Judgment. 
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The district court was in error in imposing a "totality of the circumstances" standard to its 
determination of whether Plaintiffs limited attempts to locate Defendants constitute due 
diligence. The district court's imposition of this incorrect standard led the district court to base 
its ruling on wholly irrelevant factors. 
In addition, the district court was in error when it granted a default judgment against 
Defendants because Plaintiffs complaint failed to plead facts that show that Plaintiff is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. Specifically, Plaintiffs complaint failed to allege a valid legal 
and factual basis for adverse possession against a cotenant. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION ALLOWING PLAINTIFF TO 
SERVE DEFENDANTS BY PUBLICATION VIOLATED STATE AND 
FEDERAL DUE PROCESS STANDARDS BECAUSE PLAINTIFF'S 
ALLEGED EFFORTS TO LOCATE DEFENDANTS PRIOR TO 
PUBLICATION WERE INSUFFICIENT TO SATISFY THE 
REASONABLE DILIGENCE REQUIREMENT OF RULE 4(d)(4) OF THE 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
A. Due process requires that before a party may be permitted to use 
substitute service of process, the party must first demonstrate that it 
exercised due diligence in attempting to locate and notify interested 
parties of action pending against them. 
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7; see also U.S. Const, amend. V; and U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. 
Specifically, when a person's property rights are at stake, due process entitles him/her to "notice 
and an opportunity to be heard." Dusenbery v. U.S., 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002) [citing U.S. v. 
James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 48 (1993)]. Service of process generally represents 
the procedural means by which a party's right to due process is protected and by which 
jurisdiction is asserted. Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 1269, 1271 (Utah 1987). However, "when 
notice is a personfs due, process which is a mere gesture is not due process. The means 
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employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably 
adopt to accomplish it." Mullane v. Cent, Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950). 
In Mullane, the U.S. Supreme Court, in addressing a due process challenge to the 
sufficiency of notice by publication to beneficiaries on a judicial settlement of accounts by the 
trustee of a common trust fund, articulated a balancing test to be applied by courts in determining 
the adequacy of the chosen form of notice. Id. at 313-14. Under this test, the court must weigh 
the interest of the state in the subject matter of the proceeding against the individual's due 
process interest in having an opportunity to be heard. Id, This right, the Court noted, "has little 
reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself 
whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest." Id, at 314. 
The Court went on to explain that while personal service is the ideal method of providing 
interested parties with actual notice of an action pending against them, there exist situations for 
which personal service may be impossible or impracticable. Id, at 319. Under those 
circumstances, it may be appropriate for a court to permit an alternative form of service; 
however, the alternative method chosen must be the one most reasonably calculated under the 
circumstances to apprise the interested party of the action. Id, Publication, which usually 
represents the alternative form of service least likely to achieve this objective, is generally 
reserved for cases involving missing or unknown persons or other situations "where it is not 
reasonably possible or practicable to give more adequate warning." Id, at 317. As applied to the 
facts of Mullane, the Court concluded that such notice was only valid with respect to those 
beneficiaries whose interests or whereabouts could not be ascertained through due diligence. Id. 
I 
I 
I 
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In Carlson, the Utah Supreme Court applied the Mullane test in determining when a 
plaintiff could use substitute service of process when attempting to give notice of suit to a 
nonresident motorist. Carlson, 740 P.2d at 1272-73. Upon delineating both the State's interest 
in adjudicating the case and the defendant's due process interest in being informed of the 
proceedings, the Carlson Court considered 'the practical difficulties that face a plaintiff who 
must serve notice on a difficult-to-find adversary," and determined that "a plaintiff must act 
diligently and take such steps in attempting to give the defendant actual notice of the proceeding 
as are reasonably practicable." Id. at 1275. Specifically, the Court held that the plaintiff could 
not satisfy "due process requirements by using substitute service of process mailed to a last 
known address without first having shown that diligent efforts have been made to locate the 
defendant." Id. (emphasis supplied). Thereafter, the Court concluded that before a party could 
qualify for substitute service of process, as provided in the non-resident motorist statute, it must 
first demonstrate that it exercised due diligence similar to that required by Rule 4(f) [now Rule 
4(d)(4)] of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 1276. 
B. Plaintiffs affidavit failed <o aver facts sufficient to satisfy 
reasonable (due) diligence as required by Rule 4(d)(4)(A) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure in attempting to locate the whereabouts of 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs counsel failed to allege in the affidavit in support of its Motion for Service by 
Publication efforts sufficient to satisfy the reasonable diligence requirement of Rule 4(d)(4)(A), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the district court erred in allowing Plaintiff to serve 
Defendants by publication. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 4(d)(4)(A) sets forth the general 
procedural standards a Plaintiff must satisfy before it may resort to service by publication: 
"Where the identity or whereabouts of the person to be served are unknown and cannot be 
ascertained through reasonable diligence... the party seeking service may file a motion supported 
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by affidavit requesting an order allowing service by publication or by some other means." 
Furthermore, the supporting affidavit must demonstrate that the identity or location of the person 
to be served is unknown and that it cannot be ascertained through reasonable diligence, as well 
as set forth the specific efforts made by the plaintiff to identify or locate the person to be served. 
Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d 768, 773 (Utah App. Ct. 1997). It is not enough for an 
affidavit to state mere conclusions as to a diligent search and inquiry. Downey State Bank v. 
Major-Blakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507, 509 (Utah 1976). 
Justice Wolfe clearly explained this due diligence standard in his oft-cited concurring 
opinion in Parker v. Ross, 217 P.2d 373, 379 (Utah 1950), and the Utah Court of Appeals 
reiterated Justice Wolfe's explanation in Bonneville Billing: 
The diligence to be pursued and shown by the affidavit is that which is reasonable 
under the circumstances and not all possible diligence which may be conceived. 
Nor is it that diligence which stops just short of the place where if it were 
continued might reasonably be expected to uncover an address or the fact of death 
of the person on whom service is sought... It is that diligence which is appropriate 
to accomplish the end sought and which is reasonably calculated to do so. If the 
end sought is the address of an out-of-state defendant it encompasses those steps 
most likely, under the circumstances, to accomplish that result. 
Bonneville Billing, 949 P.2d at 775. 
Applying Justice Wolfe's explanation of due diligence to the facts of the case, the 
Bonneville Billing Court concluded that plaintiffs affidavit failed to demonstrate that Plaintiff 
had exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to serve defendant in California, and that the 
trial court improperly granted Plaintiffs motion for alternative service. Id. at 776. Particularly 
damaging to plaintiffs case was its failure to set forth in its affidavit any efforts made to locate 
defendant once it learned that he might be living in California. Id. at 775. Although Bonneville 
asserted that it had met the reasonable diligence requirement by contacting all the addresses of 
the defendant obtained from a single medical payment form, the court concluded that "[d]ue 
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diligence requires more than attempting to contact addresses on a single form." Id. It required, at 
a minimum, that once a plaintiff had notice that the original address was ineffective, the plaintiff 
was under an obligation to make an effort to locate the defendant's present address. Id. Even 
though Bonneville later asserted in its brief additional efforts it made to contact the defendant at 
his California location, the court held that Bonneville failed to meet the due diligence 
requirement because no such efforts were alleged in its affidavit. Id. "The fact that [plaintiff] 
made no claim in the affidavit for alternative service is dispositive since the trial court would 
have relied only on that affidavit when it granted the motion." Id. n. 6. 
Similarly, in this case, Plaintiff failed to allege in its affidavit efforts adequate to support 
the trial court's order granting Plaintiffs Motion for Service by Publication. The allegations in 
the affidavit and memorandum supporting the Motion for Service by Publication are dispositive 
because they represent the documents the trial court relied on in granting Plaintiffs Motion. In 
his affidavit, counsel for Plaintiff stated the following: 
That the last reported address for defendants Robert C. Marrs and Douglas R. 
Marts, obtained from documents filed with the Washington County recorder, is 
not viable, and that I am unable to determine the location or address of any of the 
named defendants and therefore believe that the only effective means of 
communicating service upon the defendants is by publication . . . 
(R. at 16) 
This statement by Plaintiffs counsel embodies all the efforts alleged by Plaintiff in its 
affidavit to locate Defendants' whereabouts. In its Ex Parte Motion and Supporting 
Memorandum for Notice by Publication, Plaintiff further alleged that a letter from its counsel 
addressed to Defendants' last known address was returned "undeliverable," and that service by 
mail would have been ineffective. Considered together, Plaintiffs alleged efforts to locate and 
serve Defendants consisted of the obtaining of an old address from the Washington County 
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Recorder's office and the mailing of a certified letter to that address. These alleged efforts fail to 
demonstrate the exercise of reasonable diligence. 
Upon learning that the last known address of one of the two Defendants was not viable, 
Plaintiff does not report any additional steps taken to ascertain either of the Defendants' 
addresses or telephone numbers. Plaintiff simply states its own conclusion in its Affidavit of 
Counsel that Plaintiff is "unable to determine the location or address of any of the named 
defendants..." (See Affidavit of Counsel, of Record). Again, as this Court held in Downey State 
Bank, it is not enough for an affidavit to state mere conclusions as to a diligent search and 
inquiry. 545 P.2d at 509. 
Apparently, Plaintiff made no additional efforts to locate the Defendants' current 
whereabouts. Plaintiff made no further attempts at personal service and did not consult either 
telephone or Internet directories. Additionally, Plaintiff made no attempt to contact Defendants' 
former cotenant, Mac Reber, from whom Plaintiff acquired its interest in the Property, in an 
effort to obtain Defendants' whereabouts. Mr. Reber is a resident of Washington County; Mr. 
Reber's phone number has, at all relevant times, been listed in the local phone book; and prior to 
Plaintiff obtaining its interest in the Property, Mr. Reber was a cotenant with Defendants for a 
period of approximately four (4) years and a cotenant with Defendants' father for almost thirteen 
(13) years before that. 
By pursuing any one of these measures cited above, Plaintiff would likely have been able 
to successfully locate at least one and probably both of the Defendants. Defendant, Douglas 
Marrs has resided in the same location, in the same city as his last known address since 1991, has 
been employed by the same company since 1979, and has at all times been listed in the local 
phone book. Moreover, Mac Reber has had Defendants' contact information at all times relevant 
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to this action and could easily have supplied it to Plaintiff had it made the effort to contact him. 
Plaintiff, having ample resources at its disposal for locating Defendants, failed avail itself of any 
of them, and was nonetheless permitted to serve Defendants by publication. As Justice Wolfe 
stated in his oft-cited special concurrence in Parker v. Ross, 
it would be somewhat embarrassing (for a lower court) if after publication had 
been ordered and judgment on constructive service rendered, the owner should 
appear and show that he had received no notice of the action but that his address 
could have easily been ascertained had a trifle of ingenuity been exercised as a 
part of diligence. 
217 P.2d at 379. Not only did Plaintiff fail to exercise a "trifle of ingenuity", Plaintiff failed to 
utilize obvious and available resources in locating Defendants. As a result of the lower court's 
approval of Plaintiff s half-hearted attempts that stopped well short of any degree of diligence, 
Defendants' due process rights were violated. 
To prevent such due process violations in the future, this Court should delineate a 
threshold of objective behavior to guide future plaintiffs desirous of satisfying the reasonable 
diligence requirements of Rule 4(d)(4)(A). The Oklahoma Supreme Court established just such 
a precedent in Bomford v. Socony Mobil Oil Company, 440 P.2d 713 (Okla. 1968): 
Primary sources at hand, such as local lax rules, deed records, judicial records and 
other official records, as well as available secondary sources, such as a telephone 
directory, a city directory or the like must be exhausted before the approval of 
publication process as a method of notification. 
Considering the abundance of print, telephonic and electronic resources for finding people 
currently available at little or no cost to the public, including the well-known ability to conduct 
nationwide Internet name searches in a matter of minutes, today's plaintiffs have little or no 
excuse for failing to exhaust these resources before resorting to service by publication. 
Accordingly, this case presents an excellent opportunity for this Court to lay down a specific and 
objective threshold of essential actions plaintiffs must fulfill before they may consider requesting 
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the trial court to order service by publication. Obviously, in some situations a court may require 
additional measures be taken to locate defendants in order to satisfy reasonable diligence; and 
under other circumstances, the threshold actions may be considered sufficient. In either event, 
this Court could preserve the discretion of the trial court, provide to plaintiffs more objective and 
identifiable criteria to guide their efforts, and, most importantly, better protect defendants against 
ex parte assertions of reasonable diligence that subvert due process. 
In conclusion, due process demands that Plaintiff allege specific efforts in its affidavit 
evidencing that reasonable diligence was exercised in attempting to identify, locate or serve 
Defendants before the lower court can approve service by publication. In light of Rule 
4(d)(4)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah case law, Plaintiffs affidavit falls 
substantially short of that standard. Therefore, this Court should reverse the district court's 
Order dismissing Defendants' Motion to Quash Service and Set Aside Default Judgment. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF A 
"TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES" STANDARD TO THE 
DETERMINATION OF WHETHER PLAINTIFF EXERCISED 
REASONABLE DILIGENCE IN ATTEMPTING TO LOCATE 
DEFENDANTS AND NOTIFY THEM OF THE ACTION PENDING 
AGAINST THEM. 
The district court's application of a "totality of the circumstances" standard to its 
determination of whether reasonable diligence was exercised by Plaintiff in attempting to locate 
Defendants was inappropriate because the circumstances upon which it based its decision were 
irrelevant to Plaintiffs obligation to exercise reasonable diligence. As stated previously, "[t]he 
diligence to be pursued and shown by the affidavit is that which is reasonable under the 
circumstances and not all possible diligence which may be conceived." Parker v. Ross, 111 P.2d 
373, 379 (Utah 1950) (Wolfe, J., concurring) (emphasis added). The relevant circumstances 
envisioned by this standard are those that relate to "that diligence which is appropriate to 
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accomplish the end sought and which is reasonably calculated to do so." Id. Thus, "[i]f the end 
sought is the address of an out-of-state defendant (reasonable diligence) encompasses those steps 
most likely, under the circumstances, to accomplish that result." Id. 
Under reasonable diligence then, the efforts required to locate and notify a single 
defendant residing in the same state as a plaintiff will likely be different than the efforts required 
of the same plaintiff in attempting to locate and notify multiple defendants living in different 
states. For this reason, "due diligence must be tailored to fit the circumstances of each case." Id. 
Therefore, a determination of reasonable diligence would not include the consideration of 
circumstances that are not related to either the possibility or practicality of locating or notifying 
the opposing party. 
Here, the district court, applying a "totality of the circumstances" approach in 
determining whether Plaintiff satisfied the requirements of reasonable diligence, based its 
decision on circumstances that were wholly unrelated to the possibility or practicality of locating 
and notifying Defendants. It its Order denying Defendants' Motion, the district court found that 
(1) Plaintiff redeemed the Property from two tax sales and (2) that Defendants relied on an 
alleged phone call between Plaintiff and Defendant in 1986, and that these findings supported the 
conclusion that, based on the totality of the circumstances, "service was effective" and "default 
judgment was appropriately entered." In reaching it's the decision, the district court did not refer 
to any specific efforts made by the Plaintiff to locate and/or contact Defendants. 
The factors relied on by the district court were clearly unrelated to a determination of 
reasonable diligence. The lower court's consideration of these irrelevant factors is tantamount to 
a ruling that Defendants' failure to pay property taxes somehow diminishes Defendants' 
Constitutional right to due process, i.e., the rights to notice and an opportunity to be heard. See 
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Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. Accordingly, the trial court's order denying Defendants' Motion to 
Quash Service and Set Aside Default Judgment is not sustainable and should be reversed. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
ORDER GRANTING DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANTS 
WAS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE PLAINTIFF'S ORIGINAL 
COMPLAINT FAILED TO ALLEGE FACTS THAT MET THE LEGAL 
REQUIREMENTS FOR ADVERSE POSSESSION AS AGAINST A 
COTENANT. 
A. A trial court may not enter default judgment against a defaulting 
party unless the well-pled facts of the non-defaulting party's 
complaint state a valid cause of action. 
The district court should have set aside default judgment in this case because Plaintiffs 
original complaint fails to state a claim for adverse possession against a cotenant. Rule 55, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for the entry of default against a party "against whom a 
judgment for affirmative relief is sought" when such party fails "to plead or otherwise defend" as 
provided by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. However, "the entry of default does not 
automatically entitle a plaintiff to default judgment for the damages claimed in the complaint." 
Skanchy v. Calcados, 952 P.2d 1071, 1076 (Utah 1998). 
"A default judgment is valid only if the well-pled facts show that the plaintiff is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law." Id. If the undisputed allegations of the complaint fail to state a 
valid claim against the defaulting party, default judgment is impermissible. Id. Moreover, it is 
the judge's responsibility to review the complaint and "determine whether the allegations state a 
valid claim for relief..." Id. Although the well-pled facts of the non-defaulting party are 
considered binding and may support default judgment, the party's legal allegations are not. Id. 
Thus, the trial court is permitted to grant default judgment only if "a valid legal basis supported 
by well-pled facts is asserted in the complaint." Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, "[o]n 
appeal from a default judgment, a defendant may contest 'the sufficiency of the complaint and its 
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allegations to support the judgment.'" Id. [quoting Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Houston Natl. 
Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975)]. 
B. Plaintiffs complaint fails to allege a valid legal and factual basis 
for adverse possession as against a cotenant. 
Plaintiffs allegations in its original complaint for Quiet Title and Adverse Possession fail 
to meet the strict requirements for adverse possession against a cotenant. Therefore, the district 
court erred in finding the order for default judgment to be proper. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-7 states: 
In every action for the recovery of real property, or the possession thereof, the 
person establishing a legal title to the property shall be presumed to have been 
possessed thereof within the time required by law; and the occupation of the 
property by any other person shall be deemed to have been under and in 
subordination to the legal title, unless it appears that the property has been held 
and possessed adversely to such legal titles for seven years before the 
commencement of the action. 
In Utah, in order for a claimant to adversely possess property, the claimant must intend to 
acquire title, give actual or constructive notice by declaration or by conduct to the legal 
titleholder, and must possess the property in an open, notorious or hostile manner for a period of 
seven years. Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585., 587 (Utah 1982). Moreover, the statutory period of 
possession does not begin until the claimant engages in conduct that creates a cause of action. 
Id. at 588. 
While the above standard represents the typical analysis for an adverse possession claim 
between strangers, the standard is heightened when the claim for adverse possession is against a 
cotenant. Id. at 587. Because cotenants hold a community interest in particular property, they 
"stand in a unique relationship of confidence and trust" that rises to the level of a fiduciary 
relationship. Id. [ciimgHeiseltv. Heiselt, 349 P.2d 175, 177 (I960)]. Consequently, "(t)he 
cotenant must meet a higher, stricter standard of notice to his cotenant commensurate with his 
20 
position of trust." Id. at 588 n. 3. The nature of the cotenant relationship gives rise to two 
presumptions: (1) "possession and use by one cotenant is presumed to be possession and use by 
all cotenants," and (2) "any act calculated to protect the property against a lien or sale, or 
otherwise, will be presumed to be for the benefit of all cotenants unless the contrary is clearly 
made to appear." Id. at 588. The result of these presumptions is that parties claiming adverse 
possession against cotenants must demonstrate to the rest of the world, "by acts of the most open 
and notorious character," their intention to reject the rights of their cotenants; id. {Citing 
McCready v. Fredericksen, 126 P. 316, 320 (Utah 1912) [Quoting Elder v. McClaskey, 70 F. 
529, 542 (1895)]), and those acts must give notice of the adverse claim to other cotenants in 
some "clear and unequivocal manner." Id. at 589. 
In McCready, this Court established the rule that a claim for adverse possession against a 
cotenant was not created by one cotenant's payment of taxes, purchase of a tax deed, and 
possession of the property because those actions were presumed to be for the benefit of the other 
cotenants. McCready, 126 P. at 320; See also Massey v. Prothero, 664 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 
1983); Sweeney Land Co. v. Kimball, 786 P.2d 760, 762 (Utah 1990). Also, in Olwell, this Court 
concluded that a claimants' payment of taxes, preservation of title, possession, use and reputation 
as sole owners were insufficient to inform cotenants of the adverse claim. Olwell, 658 P.2d at 
589. Finally, in Sperry v. Tolley, 199 P.2d 542, 546 (Utah 1948), this Court found that a claim 
for adverse possession could not be sustained by exclusive possession, cultivation and 
improvement of the property. The only conduct on the part of the claimants in any of these cases 
that was deemed possibly sufficient to put the other cotenants on notice of a claimant's adverse 
claim was an advertisement for sale or actual sale of part or all of the property. See McCready, 
126 P. at 320; and Sperry, 199 P.2d at 546. In Olwell, however, this Court found that the 
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claimants' conveyance of an undivided interest in all of the mining claims to the property was 
not an act of the most open and notorious character that gave clear and unequivocal notice of the 
adverse claim to the cotenants. Olwell, 658 P.2d at 589. 
Applying the above analysis to the circumstances of this case, Plaintiff failed to allege 
facts sufficient to satisfy the rigorous requirements for adverse possession against a cotenant. In 
its complaint, Plaintiff alleged that it (1) remitted the full amount of property taxes for the 
Property, (2) redeemed the Property on more than one occasion from tax sales, (3) incurred costs 
in improving the Property, and (4) maintained insurance on the property. Interestingly, Plaintiff 
alleges to have paid all the taxes and maintained insurance for the Property for the last thirty 
years even though it acquired its interest in the Property only seventeen years ago. In any event, 
Utah case law dictates that courts presume thai all of these alleged acts by one cotenant have 
been done for the benefit of the other cotenants. Consequently, they do not demonstrate conduct 
of the "most open and notorious character" that would give Defendants "clear and unequivocal" 
notice of Plaintiff s adverse claim. Therefore, the well-pled facts of Plaintiff s complaint did not 
meet the legal requirements for adverse possession against a cotenant, and, as a matter of law, 
Plaintiff was not entitled to default judgment against Defendants. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, trial court's order denying Appellants' Rule 60(b)(4) Motion 
to Quash Service and Set Aside Default Judgment should be reversed. 
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